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COMMENTS
SETTLING THE FRONT PAY
CONTROVERSY UNDER THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
ACT: WHITTLESEY v. UNION CARBIDE
CORP.
As part of historic legislation designed to eliminate a wide ar-
ray of discriminatory employment practices,' Congress 20 years
ago commissioned a study to examine the advisability of enacting
legislation to prohibit age discrimination in employment.2 The
fruit of this study was the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 (ADEA), 3 which was designed in part "to help employers
See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat.
241, 253-256 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-17 (1976)). Under Title VII,
it is illegal for an employer to discriminate on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex or
national origin". Id. at § 703(a)(1).
I Id. at § 715. The Special Study by the Secretary of Labor, after exploring the possibil-
ity of non-statutory means of dealing with age discrimination and examining various state
approaches to the problem, recommended legislative action to combat what was character-
ized as a "persistent and widespread practice of arbitrary age discrimination against older
workers." See Report of the Secretary of Labor to the Congress Under Section 715 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, The Older American Worker: Age Discrimination In Employment
(1965), reprinted in Hearings Before the Select Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm.
on Education and Labor on Employment Problems of Older Workers, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
201 (1966). In 1967, President Johnson advocated Congressional action by noting that
"[h]undreds of thousands, not yet old, not yet voluntarily retired, find themselves jobless
because of arbitrary age discrimination." See H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st. Sess. 2,
reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2213, 2214. Congressional attempts to pro-
hibit age discrimination date to as early as 1951, see J. NORTHRUP, OLD AGE, HANDICAPPED
AND VIETNAM-ERA ANTIDISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION 7 (1977), and several unsuccessful at-
tempts were made to include age as a protected class under Title VII, see A. LARSON, EM-
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 98.32, at 21-9 to 21-11 (1983); Note, The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARv. L. REV. 380, 381 n.7 (1976); see also Blackburn, Chart-
ing Compliance Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 57 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
559, 560-62 n.5 (1981) (early federal and state efforts to combat age discrimination).
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982). The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA) makes it unlawful for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
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and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the im-
pact of age on employment. 4 Many of the substantive and proce-
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this chapter.
Id. § 623(a). It is also illegal under the Act for employers to advertise in such a way as to
indicate "any preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination, based on age." Id. §
623(e); 29 C.F.R. § 860.36 (1984). Employees age 40 through age 69 are covered by the Act
as the result of 1978 amendments that raised the former age ceiling of 65. See 29 U.S.C. §
631 (1976), amended by 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1982). Mandatory retirement is permitted, how-
ever, when age is shown to be a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). See, e.g.,
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 229 (1983); Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d
224, 238 (5th Cir. 1976) (employer may vindicate hiring policies by showing that the con-
tended discrimination is a BFOQ); Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859, 865
(7th Cir. 1974) (Greyhound demonstrated that maximum hiring age policy is based on good
faith judgment concerning safety needs of passengers and others), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1122 (1975); McKenry, Enforcement of Age Discrimination in Employment Legislation, 32
HASTINGs L.J. 1157, 1175 (1981) (BFOQ accepted more readily as defense in ADEA cases).
But see also TransWorld Airlines v. Thurston, 53 U.S.L.W. 4024, 4027 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1985)
(employer cannot successfully interpose BFOQ defense to discriminate against older worker
seeking to transfer to another position on ground that age was BFOQ for former job).
As part of the 1978 Amendments, Congress provided an exemption permitting the com-
pulsory retirement of employees 65 years of age provided they were entitled to at least
$27,000 per year in benefits and were for at least 2 years prior to their retirement employed
in a "bona fide executive" or "high policy-making" position." See 29 U.S.C. § 631(c)(1)
(1982); infra note 18 and accompanying text. One commentator has criticized the exemption
by noting that it "allow[s] a group to qualify for mandatory retirement on the basis of in-
come and job responsibility alone without requiring a determination of vocational compe-
tence,. . . [and thereby]. . . contradicts its stated purpose-to broaden and strengthen the
Act's coverage and further eliminate arbitrary discrimination based on age." Note, Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978: A Questionable Expansion, 27
CATH. U. L. REV. 767, 783 (1978).
4 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1982). The ADEA places great emphasis on the potential for ad-
ministrative conciliation and mediation as a recourse to litigation by requiring that a private
litigant file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within
180 days after the alleged unlawful practice has occurred and then wait 60 days before
bringing suit. See id. § 626(d)(1). The Supreme Court has held, however, that while plaintiffs
are required to pursue available state remedies before commencing a federal suit, claimants
are not barred by virtue of shorter state time limitations. See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans,
441 U.S. 750, 754-765 (1979). During the period before suit can be commenced, the EEOC is
required to notify named defendants and "promptly seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful
practice by informal methods of conciliation, conference and persuasion." 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)
(1982). Moreover, the ADEA, provides that the private right to sue terminates upon com-
mencement of an action by the EEOC on behalf of an individual. See id. § 626(c)(1); see
also Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp., 495 F.2d 368, 374 (8th Cir. 1974) (legislative history of
Act indicates that exhaustive administrative action was designed to achieve conciliation
before legal action was begun).
Pursuant to Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 19807, 92 Stat. 3781, re-
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dural questions under the ADEA have been resolved by comparing
age discrimination with more highly publicized employer
prejudices and by interpreting the ADEA in light of the goals and
provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).'
When ascertaining the scope of available remedies, however, courts
have referred not only to Title VII, but also to the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA),6 the remedial provisions of which are in-
corporated into the ADEA.7 This incorporation of FLSA provisions
printed in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 9799-800, administrative and enforcement
functions previously vested in the Secretary of Labor under the ADEA were transferred to
the EEOC. Id. The plan, however, contains a one-house veto clause of a type subsequently
held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. See INS v. Chadha 462 U.S. 919, 922 (1983).
There currently is some disagreement among the circuits as to whether Chadha, in effect,
invalidates the Reorganization Plan in its entirety. Compare EEOC v. Hernando Bank, 724
F.2d 1188, 1190-92 (5th Cir. 1984) (one-house veto provision is severable and therefore does
not invalidate plan in entirety) with EEOC v. CBS, Inc., 745 F.2d 969, 97-75 (2d Cir. 1984)
(since veto provision not severable, plan is unconstitutional in its entirety and EEOC lacks
authority to enforce ADEA). It should be noted, however, that the House of Representitives
has already approved legislation to correct the constitutional infirmity. See H.R. 1314, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. 2519-21 (daily ed. April 10, 1984).
5 See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978). The Supreme Court has noted that
the prohibitions enunciated in the ADEA "were derived in haec verba from Title VII." Id;
see, e.g., Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1032 (2d Cir. 1980), (Title VII disparate impact
principles applicable to ADEA suits), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981); Transworld Airlines
v. Thurston, 53 U.S.L.W. 4024, 4026 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1985) (Title VII burden of proof concepts
in cases where there is direct evidence of discrimination apply in age suits); Franci v. Avco
Corp., 538 F. Supp 250, 255 (D. Conn. 1982) (Title VII case law adaptable to ADEA); see
also Rosenblum & Biles, The Aging of Age Discrimination-Evaluating ADEA Intrepreta-
tions and Employee Relations Policies, 8 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 22, 24 (1982) (ADEA and
Title VII, in light of their common goals, are often read in tandem). But see Laugesen v.
Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 312 (6th Cir. 1975) (inappropriate simply to borrow and auto-
matically apply Title VII guidelines to ADEA); Schickman, The Strengths & Weaknesses of
the McDonnell Douglas Formula in Jury Actions Under the ADEA, 32 HASTINGS L. J.
1239, 1260 (1981) (McDonnell Douglas test needs to be refined when applied to ADEA ac-
tions); Note, supra note 2, at 382 (addressing distinctions between age discrimination and
race or sex discrimination that might justify differing standards of proof).
6 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 201-219 (1982)) (FLSA). Remedies commonly dispensed under the ADEA and the
FLSA include injunctive relief to prevent discriminatory advertising or discriminatory hir-
ing policies, reinstatement of an unlawfully discharged employee to the same job or a com-
parable position, recovery of back wages that would have been earned but for the discrimi-
nation, and reasonable attorney's fees. See Note, Age Discrimination in Employment:
Available Federal Relief, 11 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 281, 334-35 (1975).
7 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978). In Lorillard, the
Supreme Court held that a private litigant had a right to a jury trial under the ADEA. 434
U.S. at 585. The Court, while noting that Congress incorporated FLSA remedial provisions
within the ADEA, id. at 574-75, also indicated that Congress showed a "willingness to de-
part from those provisions regarded as undesirable or inappropriate for incorporation," id.
at 581. Thus, unlike under the FLSA, liquidated damages equal to the pecuniary loss are
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has led some courts to conclude that an award of prospective dam-
ages measured from the date of judgment, known as front pay,' is
not permissible under the ADEA.9 Recently, however, an increas-
ing number of courts have recognized the legitimacy of such
awards. 10 In Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp.," for instance, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that in certain cir-
cumstances when reinstatement is not feasible, "front pay" is an
acceptable alternative remedy under the ADEA.
12
recoverable only for "willful violations"of the ADEA. Id. at 581; see TransWorld Airlines v.
Thurston, 53 U.S.L.W. 4024, 4028 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1985); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b); infra note 17. In
addition, injunctive relief not available under the FLSA can be made available to litigants
under the ADEA. 434 U.S. at 581. Finally, "Congress ... declined to incorporate into the
ADEA the criminal penalties" provided within the FLSA. Id. at 581-82; see also Trans-
World Airlines v. Thurston, 53 U.S.L.W. 4024, 4027 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1985) (Congress declined
to incorporate several FLSA sections into ADEA); Note, Set-offs Against Back Pay Awards
Under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1113, 1113-14
(1981) (highlighting differences between ADEA and FLSA).
1 Front pay, as used in this Comment, can be defined as a court order to compensate
the plaintiff for pecuniary, job-related loss constituting funds that would have been received
by the employee after the date of the court's decree. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 602 (5th
ed. 1979) (defining front wages); see also Note, Front Pay-Prophylactic Relief Under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 VAND. L. REV. 211, 212 (1976). Since every case under
the ADEA that has considered the front pay issue has involved an instance of wrongful
discharge rather than an unlawful discriminatory practice affecting "terms or conditions" of
employment, a typical front pay award encompasses the salary that would have been real-
ized by the plaintiff but for the discrimination until such time as the plaintiff can obtain
comparable employment or is lawfully retired. See C. EDELMAN & I. SIEGLER, FEDERAL AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 207 (Cum. Supp. 1980). Back pay, on the other hand,
is designed to compensate the plaintiff for the "job-related benefits" lost from the date of
unlawful termination until the date judgment is entered. See Note, supra note 7, at 1118-19.
9 See, e.g., Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 874 n.4 (1st Cir. 1982) (damages are
"settled" on date of judgment even though injury continues); Covey v. Robert A. Johnston
Co., 19 Fair Empl. Cas. (BNA) 1188, 1191-92 (D. Md. 1977) (no language in ADEA explicitly
authorizes front pay and calculation would be unduly speculative); Monroe v. Penn-Dixie
Cement Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231, 235 (Ga. 1971) (front pay unavailable when reinstatement
not requested); see also infra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
10 See Crawford & McRae, The Practical Labor Lawyer. Front Pay in Lieu of Rein-
statement as a Remedy in ADEA Litigation, 9 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 705, 710 (1984); Greble,
More Courts Are Using Front Pay to Remedy Discrimination Cases, NAT'L L.J., June 6,
1983, at 26, col. 1; infra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
Historically, front pay has been granted more routinely under Title VII than it has been
under the ADEA. See Note, supra note 8, at 224-29 (examples of front pay under Title VII);
see also Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 781 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring
and dissenting) (front pay more equitable than competitive type seniority relief). Under
Title VII it is provided that if an employer has "intentionally engaged in or is intentionally
engaging in any unlawful employment practice," the court may order "any ... equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
1 742 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1984).
12 Id. at 729.
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In Whittlesey, the defendant Union Carbide Corporation
(Union Carbide) gave notice to its chief labor counsel that he
would have to retire on his 65th birthday. 3 In justifying this action
in the face of an ADEA prohibition against mandatory retirement
before age 70,14 Union Carbide relied on an exemption that per-
mits the compulsory retirement at age 65 of certain employees in
"bona fide executive" or "high policy making" positions. 15 The
forced retirement of Whittlesey took effect on September 1, 1982.16
Subsequently, he sued to recover back pay, liquidated damages,
and either reinstatement or front pay."
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York held that Whittlesey's position did not fall within the
scope of the exemption and thereby became one of the first courts
to construe the meaning of the term "bona fide executive" or "high
policy maker."' 8 While denying liquidated damages,19 the court au-
" See 567 F. Supp. 1320, 1321 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Whittlesey had been employed as an
attorney for Union Carbide since 1953. Id.
1 See supra note 3.
1" See 567 F. Supp. at 1321; supra note 3.
" 567 F. Supp. at 1321. Whittlesey's application for a preliminary injunction was de-
nied by Judge Pierre Leval, because he determined that "there was no showing of irrepara-
ble harm" since the plaintiff had not proved that other employment was not available. Id.
17 Id. at 1330. Whittlesey claimed that he was entitled to liquidated damages equal to
his backpay. Id. Liquidated damages equal to the amount of pecuniary loss are recoverable
under the Act only for "willful violations." See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982); Trans-World Air-
lines v. Thurston, 53 U.S.L.W. 4024, 4028 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1985); E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR,
FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS §14.06, at 384 (3d ed. 1978). In Thurston, the
Supreme Court recently ended a controversy that had been raging among the circuits over
the standard to be applied in determining whether an employer has acted "willfully" and
held that a violation "is 'willful' if the employer either knew or showed reckless disregard
for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA." Thurston, 53 U.S.L.W.
at 4028. It was argued that TWA should have been liable for liquidated damages since they
knew that the ADEA was "in the picture," that is, they were aware of the Act's potential
applicability. Id.
Ironically, liability in Thurston was established as the result of an attempt to comply
with a 1978 amendment prohibiting mandatory retirement. Id. at 4025; see supra note 3. In
its attempt at compliance, TWA devised a system that allowed certain pilots forced to retire
at age 60 to continue working as flight attendants and it was this system, which gave prefer-
ence to pilots displaced for reasons other than age, that was held illegal. Id. at 4026-27.
Nonetheless, the Court refused to impose liquidated damages since TWA officials acted rea-
sonably and in good faith in attempting to determine whether their plan would violate the
ADEA. Id. at 4028.
18 567 F. Supp at 1321-28; Lewin, Judge Bars a Forced Retirement at Age 65, N.Y.
Times, July 19, 1983 at D1, col. 3. In the analysis of the test for inclusion within the ADEA
"bona fide executive" exemption, the district judge quoted extensively from interpretive
regulations promulgated by the EEOC, 29 C.F.R. § 1625.12 (1979), and from material from
the Conference Committee Report, H. CONF. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. 8-10 (1978),
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thorized a lump sum award that included back pay, and, in lieu of
reinstatement, front pay from the date of judgment until age 70.20
On appeal, Union Carbide challenged the District Court's interpre-
tation of the "bona fide executive" exemption and contended that
front pay was not permitted under the ADEA.21 Whittlesey cross-
appealed, maintaining that Union Carbide had acted willfully, thus
entitling him to an award of liquidated damages. 22 The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.23
Judge Pratt, writing for a unanimous panel, approved of the
District Court's characterization of the test for inclusion within the
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 504, 528, 530-31. See 567 F. Supp at 1322-
25. The court concluded that the regulations make clear that the exemption applies "only to
a very few top level employees who exercise substantial executive authority over a signifi-
cant number of employees and a large volume of business." Id. at 1322 (quoting 29 C.F.R. §
1625.12(d)(2) (1979)).
'9 567 F. Supp at 1330. The court concluded that there was "excusable uncertainty" on
the part of Union Carbide concerning the coverage of the 1978 amendment to the ADEA,
and therefore denied Whittlesey's request for liquidated damages. Id. In implicity rejecting
the "in the picture" test with respect to liquidated damages and focusing on the extent of
the employer's actual knowledge, the Whittlesey court, it is suggested, is in conformity with
subsequent Supreme Court pronouncements. See TransWorld Airlines v. Thurston, 53
U.S.L.W. 4024, 4028 (U.S. Jan 8, 1985); supra note 17.
20 See 567 F. Supp. at 1330-31. The district court noted that Union Carbide had exhib-
ited "hostility and outrage against [Whittlelsey] by reason of his bringing the suit," id. at
1330, and, therefore, since "he would be ostracized and excluded from the functions of giv-
ing counsel," reinstatement was not the "ideal remedy," id. Instead, Whittlesey was
awarded front pay reduced by whatever sum he could have earned in mitigation. Id. at
1330-31.
The actual computation of front pay was rendered in a separate opinion. See No. 82-
4401 slip op. at 6 (S.D.N.Y. October 13, 1983). Union Carbide argued that rather than
awarding a lump sum payment, the court should conduct "annual proceedings to ascertain
the amounts of plaintiff's actual earnings in mitigation." Id. at 7. While conceding that
there existed "important future uncertainties," id., the court summarily refused the chore of
periodic supervision, citing "obvious reasons involving finality of litigation and the ability of
courts to deal with their cases," id.
Whittlesey was credited with an annual salary of $93,000, offset by $25,000, which the
court determined he could earn annually in mitigation, and $34,893, which he would have
contributed to the pension plan, as well as any social security benefits received. Id. at 4. In
addition, the court drew inferences against Union Carbide since it failed to furnish "easily
available evidence" regarding the amount of bonuses Whittlesey was to receive, and added
an incentive bonus of $18,600 per year. Id. Inflation was netted against the inflation compo-.
nent of the discount rate, leaving a discount for pure interest at the rate of 2%. Id. Each of
the several calculations was strenuously contested by Union Carbide. Id. at 5. Whittlesey,
who was 68 years of age at the time of judgment, received a total award of $242,649.08. See
742 F.2d at 726.
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"bona fide executive" exemption as properly "one of function, not
of pay."'24 Since Whittlesey was engaged primarily in legal work
and was not encouraged or invited to play a dynamic policy-creat-
ing role,25 the court held that the position did not come within the
exemption contemplated by the statute and regulations.26 There-
fore, Whittlesey was entitled to ADEA protection.
In approving front pay as a permissible remedy, Judge Pratt
conceded that many of the enforcement provisions of the ADEA
were modeled after the remedies in the FLSA,2 7 yet asserted that
remedies under the ADEA were not limited to those recoverable
under the former statute.28 Section 626(b) of the ADEA, the court
contended, contains a "broad grant of remedial authority" not pre-
sent under the FLSA that authorizes front pay awards when rein-
statement is not possible.29 Such a situation could occur, Judge
Pratt suggested, either when the plaintiff's position has been elimi-
nated or when the employer-employee relationship has been "ir-
reparably damaged by animosity associated with the litigation." 30
The court determined that judicial experience with prospective
damages in employment contract and personal injury cases cou-
pled with the plaintiff's duty to mitigate damages were seen as suf-
ficient safeguards against unduly speculative or excessive awards.31
Moreover, Judge Pratt was not persuaded by the argument that
the possibility of front pay would discourage settlements.2 Any
tendency on the part of plaintiffs to hold out in the hope of recov-
ering large monetary awards, the court reasoned, would be "bal-
anced by defendants' increased inclination to compromise when
faced with a possible liability for front pay."33
24 Id.
25 Id. at 726-27.
26 Id.
2 Id. at 727.
28 Id. The court, citing Geller v. Markham, 635 F. 2d 1027, 1036 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981), noted that district judges in the Second Circuit "have previ-
ously [been] encouraged . . .to fashion remedies designed to ensure that victims of age
discrimination are made whole." Id. at 727-28.
29 Id. at 728.
30 Id.
31 Id. In support of the proposition that courts are capable of "determinfing] reasona-
ble compensation when reinstatement is inappropriate," the Court cited Koyen v. Consoli-
dated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp 1161, 1167 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), and noted that front pay had
been awarded in Title VII cases. See 742 F.2d at 728; supra note 10.




It is submitted that in Whittlesey, the Second Circuit prop-
erly concluded that awards of front pay are not precluded under
the ADEA. Indeed, the case is illustrative of a recent judicial trend
to approve such awards irrespective of whether the plaintiff has
requested reinstatement.3 4 This trend, it is suggested, will have
monetary implications that could significantly affect the character
of pretrial negotiations between aggrieved workers and their em-
ployers in a way that will decrease the likelihood that reinstate-
ment will remain an acceptable remedy by the time judgment is
rendered. 35 By tracing the development of the courts' present ac-
quiescence to the remedy and analyzing various similarities to the
debate over the availability of compensatory damages for pain and
suffering under the ADEA, this Comment will explore the issues
raised by Whittlesey and will suggest an approach for district
courts confronted with a choice between forced reinstatement and
front pay.
Section 626(b): "A Model of Imprecision"
Senator Jacob Javits, a major sponsor of the ADEA, noted
that the enforcement provisions of the ADEA are "directly analo-
gous to those available under the Fair Labor Standards Act." 6 De-
4 See supra note 10; infra notes 47-52.
"I The willingness of courts to recognize front pay awards coincides with an increase in
the number of suits being brought under the Act. See Weaver, Age Discrimination Charges
Found in Sharp Rise in U.S., N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1982, at A12, col. 1 (formal charges of
age discrimination filed with EEOC rose 75% from 1979 to 1981). Arguably, demographic
trends indicate that suits brought under the Act will continue to rise. See Morrison, The
Aging of the U.S. Population: Human Resource Implications, MONTHLY LAB. REV., May
1983, at 13, 14 (population age 55 and over is expected to increase to nearly 70 million over
the next 30 years and 35 million people will be at least 65 years old); see also Rones, The
Aging of the Older Population and the Effect on its Labor Force Rates, MONTHLY LAB.
REV., Sept. 1982, at 27; Fullerton, The 1995 Labor Force: A First Look, MONTHLY LAB. REV.
Dec., 1980, at 11-21.
36 113 CONG. REc. 31,254 (1967). On the day the ADEA was passed, Senator Javits
stated that "[tihe enforcement techniques provided by [the ADEA] are directly analogous
to those available under the Fair Labor Standards Act; ... [and] incorporates by reference,
to the greatest extent possible, the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act." Id. (quoted
in Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 582 (1978)). It has been suggested that the incorporation
of FLSA procedures into the Act was not intended "to reflect differences in the degree of
protection to be afforded." See Note, supra note 2, at 381. Indeed, it has been noted that
the incorporation was motivated in part by "administrative convenience," see id. It was
believed that the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor would have the
ability to handle complaints more efficiently than the overburdened EEOC, which had juris-
diction over claims arising under Title VII. See id.; see also Pavlo v. Stiefel Laboratories,
Inc., 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 489, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Note, Damage Remedies
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spite the seeming clarity of this statement of congressional intent,
the remedial section of the ADEA has created conceptual difficul-
ties for courts by both referring specifically to the limited remedies
available under the FLSA and subsequently granting district
courts broad equitable power to fashion relief.3 7
The Controversy
In Monroe v. Penn. Dixie Cement Corp.,3" the first reported
case to consider the issue of front pay under the ADEA,39 it was
stated categorically that ". . . money damages in a case under the
Age Discrimination Act must be liquidated as of the date of judg-
ment. ' 40 Since the wrongfully discharged plaintiff in Monroe did
not request reinstatement, which would have mitigated damages,
the court held that he had waived any future rights against his
former employer. 41 Moreover, the court noted that any computa-
tion of front pay would be "highly speculative. 42
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 43 BROOKLYN L. REv. 47, 64 n.66
(1976); supra note 7.
37 See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). Section 626(b) of the ADEA states that: "[tihe provi-
sions of this chapter shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies and proce-
dures provided in. . .[various sections of the FLSA] . . .and subsection (c) of this section,
[and] [a]mounts owing to a person as a result of a violation ...shall be deemed to be
unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation for purposes of sections 216 and
217 [of the FLSA]. ... The plain language of the statute indicates that remedies under
the ADEA should be limited to the back pay and limited injunctive remedies dispensed
under the FLSA. See Pavlo v. Stiefel Laboratories, Inc., 22 Fair Empl. Prac Cas. (BNA) 489,
493 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) Yet, in the same subsection, it is provided that "court[s] shall have
jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the
purposes of this chapter," 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), a provision which suggests that remedies
should not be so limited. Palvo, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 493. This language,
which appears to provide for broad remedial relief, is repeated in a later subsection that
confers upon an aggrieved party a right to bring private civil actions. See 29 U.S.C. §
626(c)(1) (1982).
38 335 F. Supp. 231 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
" See id. at 233 n.1.
40 Id. at 235.
41 Id. The Monroe court, relying on the incorporation of FLSA language in the Act, see
id. at 234 n.3, concluded that damages were restricted to the pecuniary loss realized prior to
trial, "set-off" by benefits and earnings realized at other jobs during that period, see id. at
234-35. It has been noted, however, that the holding of the Monroe court is limited to in-
stances in which the plaintiff has not requested reinstatement. See A. LARSON, supra note 2,
§ 103.44(a). Nonetheless, a number of courts have relied on dictum in Monroe to support
the proposition that front pay is never recoverable. See id.; infra note 44 and accompanying
text.
42 335 F. Supp at 235. The court maintained that front pay computations would be
especially speculative "in cases where the plaintiff was in his forties and, thus, had many
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The refusal of the Monroe court to authorize front pay has led
at least one circuit court to conclude that the remedy is not availa-
ble in the absence of a request for reinstatement.43 Some courts
have taken an even stricter view and have held that front pay is
never recoverable under the ADEA regardless of the plaintiff's de-
sire to be reinstated." Courts adopting the stricter view have noted
that front pay awards are not specifically authorized under the
ADEA,45 and have reiterated that such awards are unduly specula-
tive in nature."
The leading case approving front pay in the absence of a rein-
statement request is Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Corp.,47 which
involved a 66-year-old employee in Consolidated Edison's editorial
department who was discharged because of his age." In Koyen,
Judge Weinfeld concluded that since Congress incorporated a
"broad grant of equitable authority" in the ADEA that was not
years ahead in which he might or might not get raises, reductions, fired, or incapacitated all
of which could greatly affect his future earnings." Id. Mr. Monroe, however, was 58 years
old. Id. at 233.
43 See Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 283-84 (3d Cir. 1980); see also Ventura
v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 571 F. Supp 48, 50 (N.D. IlM. 1983) (plaintiff may seek to acquire
prospective pension benefits as alternative to reinstatement).
44 See Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 874 n.4 (lst Cir. 1982); Foit v. Surburban
Bancorp., 549 F. Supp. 264, 267 (D. Md. 1982); Jaffee v. Plough Broadcasting Co., 19 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1194, 1195 (D. Md. 1979); Mader v. Control Data Corp., 19 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. ((BNA)) 1192, 1193-94 (D. Md. 1978); Covey v. Robert A. Johnston Co., 19
Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1188, 1191-92 (D. Md. 1977); Price v. Maryland Casualty Co.,
391 F. Supp. 613, 621 (S.D. Miss. 1975), aff'd, 561 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1977).
4' See, e.g., Covey v. Robert A. Johnston Co., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1188, 1191 (D.
Md. 1977).
4' See id. In Covey, the court asserted that front pay would be just as speculative
whether or not the plaintiff requested reinstatement. Id. The court suggested that "[w]hen a
court finds strong reasons against reinstatement, it should be able to exercise that option
without automatically making the employer liable for potentially immense benefits in the
future." Id; accord Foit v. Surburban Bancorp., 549 F. Supp. 264, 267 (D. Md. 1982). In
Foit, the court indicated that "the plaintiff's argument that at age 49 his number of employ-
able years is limited is somewhat hard to swallow." Id. Judge Northrup went on to add that
he was 71 "and going strong ...and considering the current make-up of the Supreme
Court, [he] seriously doubt[ed] this court's rejection of [the] argument, if appealed, will be
overruled." Id. at 267 n.7.
47 560 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
4 See id. at 1162. In Koyen, the employee was awarded back pay from his termination
date to the date of judgment, which included salary increases he would have received during
that period but for the unlawful discrimination. See id. at 1164. In addition, Koyen, who
was 68 at the time of judgment, was awarded a lump sum representing the salary and other
job-related financial benefits he would have received up to his 70th birthday, offset by pay-
ments he would have received from the company pension plan. Id. at 1169.
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contained in the FLSA,49 it was intended that courts "fashion
whatever remedy is required to fully compensate an employee for
the economic injury sustained. ' 50 To deny such authority, he as-
serted, would defeat the purpose of the ADEA in providing mone-
tary damages when reinstatement is not feasible.51 Judge Wein-
feld's reasoning has been substantially adopted by several circuit
courts,52 including the Second Circuit in Whittlesey 5 3
Comparing Compensatory Damages for Pain and Suffering
A majority of the circuits that have addressed the issue have
held that, in certain circumstances, front pay is available under the
ADEA,54 yet the courts are in near unanimous agreement that
49 Id. at 1168; see supra note 37.
80 560 F. Supp. at 1168; see also Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1238 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978). In Rodriguez, the Third Circuit, relying heavily on
Supreme Court precedent under Title VII, characterized the purpose of relief under the
ADEA in a widely quoted statement: "The make whole standard of relief should be the
touchstone for the district courts in fashioning both legal and equitable remedies in age
discrimination cases. Victims of discrimination are entitled to be restored to the economic
position they would have occupied but for the intervening unlawful conduct of employers."
Id. (citing Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1976)).
"1 560 F. Supp. at 1169. Judge Weinfeld specifically rejected the notion that a plaintiff
who fails to request reinstatement automatically waives his right to prospective damages. Id.
The court held that "[to] foreclose prospective damage awards under that concept would
mean that the employee is left with no choice but to seek reinstatement, a remedy which in
particular cases may be undesirable or unwarranted considering both the employee's or em-
ployer's interests." Id.
82 See Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, 742 F.2d 916, 922-23 (6th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Pru-
dential Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 1984); supra notes 29-
31 and accompanying text.
53 See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
" See Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 922-23 (6th Cir. 1984); EEOC v.
Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 1984); Gibson v. Mo-
hawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1100-01 & n.8 (8th Cir. 1982).
In Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, (1st Cir. 1979), one of the first cases to discuss
the availability of front pay at any length, the court concluded in dicta that such awards
may be appropriate in certain circumstances,. id. at 1023. The court characterized front pay
as an equitable remedy, see id. at 1022 n.33, and drew support for its conclusion from an
FLSA case in which the Supreme Court endorsed the granting of broad equitable relief. See
id. at 1023 (citing Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 291 (1960)). In
addition, support was gleaned from cases under both Title VII and the FLSA in which
payments were made in lieu of reinstatement, id. at 1023, though it was conceded that there
was little precedent and the amounts granted "have been relatively small and. . . designed
to assist plaintiff during the period in which he can be expected to find other employment,"
id.
In a separate opinion, Judge Bownes, concurring and dissenting, distinguished the
FLSA cases cited by the majority by noting that they involved damages for "past lost
wages," not prospective damage, id. at 1026 (Bownes, J., concurring and dissenting), and
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compensatory damages for pain and suffering are never available
under the Act. 5 The issues raised by the question of compensatory
damages, however, share several important similarities with those
pertinent to the front pay controversy. 56 In fact, a majority of the
circuits that have rejected the notion that compensatory damages
are authorized under the ADEA have used some of the same argu-
ments that subsequently were found unconvincing in the context
of front pay.5
7
Thus, in the leading case disapproving of the availability of
damages for pain and suffering,58 it was stated that the ADEA
"does not mention any money damages other than 'amounts' mea-
sured by 'unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensa-
tion' and liquidated damages." 59 It was further noted that "[w]hile
flatly concluded that "[t]here is no provision in the FLSA for an award based on loss of
future earnings . . . therefore, . . . such an award is inconsistent with the ADEA," id. at
1027 (Bownes, J., concurring and dissenting); see Martinez v. Behring's Bearings Service,
Inc., 501 F.2d 104, 105 (5th Cir. 1974); Powel v. Washington Post Co., 267 F.2d 651, 652
(D.C. Cir.) (denying prospective damages under FLSA), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 930 (1959).
55 See Johnson v. Al Tech Specialties Steel Corp., 731 F.2d 143, 148 (2d Cir. 1984);
Perrell v. Financeamerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654, 657 (10th Cir. 1984); Hill v. Spiegel, Inc., 708
F.2d 233, 235-36 (6th Cir. 1983); Pfeiffer v. Essex Wire Corp., 682 F.2d 684, 685-688 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1039 (1982); Fiedler v. Indianhead Truck Line, Inc., 670 F.2d
806, 809-810 (8th Cir. 1982); Naton v. Bank of Cal., 649 F.2d 691, 698-99 (9th Cir. 1981);
Slatin v. Stanford Research Inst., 590 F.2d 1292, 1293-96 (4th Cir. 1979); Vazquez v. Eastern
Air Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 107, 109-12 (1st Cir. 1978); Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 559
F.2d 1036, 1038-39 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Rogers v. Exxon Re-
search & Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834, 839-42 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978).
56 See Ginsberg v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 500 F. Supp. 696, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
("[flor the same reasons prospective damages have been held by courts to be unauthorized,
the ADEA should be read to preclude damages for pain and suffering"); see also Jaffee v.
Plough Broadcasting Co., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 1194, 1195 (D.Md. 1979) (dam-
ages for front pay and pain and suffering are "too speculative" and not provided for by
Congress in the ADEA).
' See infra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
See Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834, 841-42 (3d. Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978).
9 Rogers, 550 F.2d at 840. In Rogers, a prominent research scientist was illegally forced
to retire at age 60, 404 F. Supp. 324, 326 (D. N.J. 1975), vacated and remanded, 550 F.2d
834, 849 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978). As a result, he "experienced a
syndrome of severe abdominal pain, vomiting and impotency, all of which," according to the
district court, "were clearly and persuasively demonstrated by [the] medical and lay testi-
mony ... to have been the proximate result of defendant's illegal discrimination." Id. at
330. Relying heavily on the "make whole" purpose of monetary damages that the ADEA
shares with Title VII, see id. at 328, the district court approved a $200,000 award of dam-
ages for pain and suffering, id. at 327, 333. The district court noted that "the ADEA essen-
tially establishes a new statutory tort ... [and] therefore, the panoply of usual tort reme-
dies is available to recompense injured parties for all provable damages." Id. at 327.
It is suggested that the district court's reliance on Title VII precedent is inappropriate
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the existence of [compensatory damages] might strengthen the
claimant's bargaining position with the employer, it would also in-
troduce an element of uncertainty which would impair the concili-
ation process." 0 Moreover, the "broad grant of remedial author-
ity" under the ADEA, which has been used to legitimize awards of
front pay,61 has been construed quite differently by the circuits
when considering the availability of compensatory damages, and
has been severely limited both by the incorporation of FLSA pro-
cedures and the definition of "amounts owing" a claimant.62
in light of the fact that damages for pain and suffering are not available under Title VII, see
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11th Cir. 1982); Shah v. Mt. Zion Hsp. &
Medical Center, 642 F.2d 268, 272 (9th. Cir. 1981); A. LARSEN, supra note 2, § 55.43, at 11-
80.69 to .71. Nonetheless, it must be conceded that there is ample support for awards for
pain and suffering among the commentators. See, e.g., Note, Compensatory & Punitive
Damages in Age Discrimination in Employment, 32 U. FLA. L. REv. 701, 728-730 (1980);
Note, supra note 36, at 88. Indeed, it has been suggested that certain discriminatory prac-
tices made illegal by the Act are analogous to the common-law tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress, see Note, supra note 36 at 51-53, and the legislative history of the
ADEA is replete with statements indicating that Congress was aware of the significant psy-
chological suffering that may accompany age discrimination, see, e.g., 404 F. Supp. at 330,
n.3.
6o Id. at 841. The Rogers court envisioned a "three-sided conflict among the employer,
the Secretary, and the claimant" that would create "serious administrative problems." Id. at
840-41. The court noted that "[tihe same drawbacks would apply in a court suit brought by
the Secretary where the question of authority between him and the claimant to decide upon
an acceptable amount would create another area of dispute." Id. at 841.
It is suggested that these same arguments could be made in the context of front pay,
yet many circuits that have made them in the context of compensatory damages have, for
some unexplained reason, found these arguments unconvincing with respect to front pay,
and have not noted the apparent inconsistency. Compare Johnson v. Al Tech Specialties
Steel Corp., 731 F.2d 143, 147-48 (2d Cir. 1984); with Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp.,
742 F.2d 724, 727 (2d Cir. 1984); compare Perrell v. Financeamerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654, 657
(10th Cir. 1984) with EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n., 741 F.2d 1225, 1231
(10th Cir. 1984); compare Hill v. Spiegel Inc., 708 F.2d 233, 235-36 (6th Cir. 1983) with
Davis v. Combustion Eng'g Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984); compare Freidler v. Indi-
anhead Truck Line, Inc., 670 F.2d 806, 810 (8th Cir. 1982) with Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber,
695 F.2d 1093, 1100-01 & n.8 (8th Cir. 1982). But see Ginsburg v. Burlington Indus., Inc.,
500 F. Supp. 696, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (suggesting that the argument is not convincing with
respect to both compensatory damages and front pay).
61 See supra notes 29, 37 and accompanying text.
62 See Pfeiffer v. Essex Wire Corp., 682 F.2d 684, 685-86 (7th Cir. 1982); see also Fied-
ler v. Indianhead Truck Line, Inc., 670 F.2d 806, 810 (8th Cir. 1982) (" § 216(b) [of FLSA]
has never been interpreted to allow damage awards beyond those specifically enumerated in
the statute"); Naton v. Bank of Cal., 649 F.2d 691, 699 (9th Cir. 1981) (compensatory dam-
ages "conspicuously omitted from definition of amounts owing"). In considering the availa-
bility of compensatory damages, the Second Circuit has enunciated a position directly con-
tradictory to the stance subsequently adopted with respect to front pay by the Whittlesey
panel, see supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text, by noting that:
The statutory provision in question further states that "[a]mounts owing.., as a
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Policy Considerations
It is submitted that neither front pay nor damages-for pain
and suffering are precluded merely as the result of statutory si-
lence; nor should the extensive incorporation of FLSA and Title
VII provisions into the ADEA render them unavailable. The broad
grant of legal and equitable authority present in the ADEA cannot
simply be ignored. 3 There are, however, certain policy considera-
tions and evidence of congressional intent that, it is suggested, ar-
gue strongly against the availability of damages for pain and suf-
fering. For instance, the fact that such damages, unlike front pay,
are designed to compensate for non-economic injury furnishes a
compelling argument that Congress did not intend them to be part
of "amounts owing" to a wrongfully discharged plaintiff.6 4 In addi-
result of a violation . . . shall be deemed to be unpaid . . wages." Under ac-
cepted principles of statutory construction, we consider this specific indication to
be dispositive of the drafters' intentions. The more expansive grant of judicial
authority relied upon by [the plaintiff] permits courts in their discretion to sup-
plement back pay awards with injunctive relief, orders of reinstatement or promo-
tion, or similar non-monetary remedies.
Johnson v. Al Tech Specialties Steel Corp., 731 F.2d 143, 147-48 (2d Cir. 1984) (citations
omitted).
63 See 2 A. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06, at 63 (Sands
ed. 1973). "A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that
no part will be inappropriate or superfluous, void or insignificant." Id. Section 216(b) of the
FLSA provides that "[a]ny employer who violates the provisions of section 215(a)(3) of this
title shall be liable for such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the
purposes of section 215(a)(3). . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982). Arguably, both references to
"legal or equitable relief" are circumscribed by the specific definition of "amounts owed"
contained in the same section of both statutes. Compare id. 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b) with id. §
626(b). However, the ADEA contains an explicit, additional subsection providing for civil
actions which empowers "any court of competent jurisdiction to grant such legal or equita-
ble relief as will effectuate the purposes of this chapter." See id. § 626(c)(1). In addition, the
fact that compensatory damages have not been made available under Title VII should not
determine their availability under the ADEA since the remedial sections of the two statutes
are very different. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982) with 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982)
and id. § 626(c)(1). Under Title VII, courts are empowered to grant only equitable relief, see
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982), whereas the ADEA authorizes the granting of both legal and
equitable relief, see 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) & (c)(1) (1982).
" See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 528, 535. In a House conference report accompanying the
1978 amendments to the ADEA, it was noted that:
[u]nder section 7(b) [29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976)], which incorporates the remedial
scheme. . . of the FLSA, "amounts owing" contemplates two elements: First, it
includes items of pecuniary or economic loss such as wages, fringe, and other job-
related benefits. Second, it includes liquidated damages (calculated as an amount
equal to the pecuniary loss) which compensate the aggrieved party for nonpecu-
niary losses arising out of a willful violation of the ADEA.
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tion, damages for pain and suffering are to some degree punitive in
nature,65 and since punitive damages are not authorized by the
ADEA66 , it has been argued that it would be inappropriate to do so
indirectly by authorizing awards for pain and suffering.6 7
With respect to the speculative nature of both awards and
their effect on pretrial conciliation processes, it should be noted
that front pay is not as inherently speculative as are damages for
pain and suffering.68 There has been near uniform recognition that
to qualify for front pay an employee must be able to point to a
date in the not-too-distant future when the award will cease.6
When this is not the case, the employee's duty to mitigate damages
by finding other employment should provide some fixed limit to
the extent of employer liability."
Id. But see Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 758 (1979) ("legislative observations
[made 11 years after the passage of an act] . . . are in no sense part of the legislative his-
tory") (quoting United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 200 n.7 (1977)); accord
Pavlo v. Stiefel Laboratories, Inc., 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 489, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
There has been a fundamental disagreement over whether an ADEA action is one that
sounds in contract or tort. Compare Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 871-72 (1st Cir.
1982) (in its "'essential nature' an ADEA action is identical to a common law suit for back
wages for breach of contract") with Pavlo v. Stiefel Laboratories, Inc., 22 Fair EmpI. Prac.
Cases (BNA) 489, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (ADEA action is primarily one for redress of a tort).
65 See Walker v. Pettit Constr. Co., 605 F.2d 128, 130 (4th Cir. 1979); Rogers, 550 F.2d
at 840; cf. Developments in the Law, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1260 (1971) (award of damages for mental
suffering includes elements of punishment).
6' See Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1039-40 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
6' See Johnson v. Al Tech Specialties Steel Corp., 731 F.2d 143, 148 (2d Cir. 1984);
Rogers, 550 F.2d at 840.
08 Front pay damages, unlike damages for pain and suffering, are designed to compen-
sate for pecuniary loss related to the job. See Ventura v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 571 F. Supp.
48, 50 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Note, supra note 8, at 212. Moreover, awards of front pay are specu-
lative not in terms of effectiveness in light of their stated goal, but only with respect to
duration. See supra note 44; see also Johnson v. Al Tech Specialties Steel Corp., 731 F.2d
143, 147 (2d Cir. 1984) (damages for pain and suffering not susceptible to computation in
administrative conciliation process).
6' See Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
Moreover, the Supreme Court's recent decision under Title VII to toll back pay liability
upon an unconditional offer of reinstatement that did not include retroactive seniority
should mean that under appropriate circumstances such an offer will extinguish front pay
liability. See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC., 458 U.S. 219, 238 (1982); Crawford & McRae, supra
note 10, at 710. But see Fiedler v. Indianhead Truck Line, Inc., 670 F.2d 806, 808 (8th Cir.
1982).
7o See O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., 574 F. Supp. 214, 219 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
In O'Donnell, the court set forth various factors that might mitigate for or against an award
of front pay including the feasibility of reinstatement under the circumstances of the case,
the plaintiff's efforts to mitigate damages by finding other comparable employment, and the
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Reinstatement
It has been suggested that making front pay available would
make reinstatement less likely and, therefore, it should not be
made available.71 Concededly, it has been uniformly recognized
that reinstating a plaintiff is preferable to providing monetary re-
lief in lieu thereof.72 Reinstatement is the remedy specifically pro-
vided by Congress,7 3 which recognized the significant psychological
damages that may accompany age discrimination,74 and expressed
concern over the continued employability of older workers. 75 None-
theless, it is suggested that making a request for reinstatement a
condition precedent to an award of prospective damages makes lit-
tle practical sense when reinstatement is truly not feasible. It is, in
fact, when reinstatement is most inappropriate that the utility of
front pay is most apparent to avoid the injustice of leaving the
victim economically disadvantaged as a result of the employer's
date of the plaintiff's lawful retirement. Id. at 197-98; See Crawford & McRae, supra note
10, at 706; see also Ginsberg v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 500 F. Supp. 696, 701 (S.D.N.Y.
1980). In Ginsberg, the court, while concluding that there is ample authority to grant awards
of front pay, declined to do so in that case "where reinstatement was not genuinely pursued,
and where the evidence that plaintiff performed inadequately was very substantial." Id.; see
also Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984) (front pay award to
41-year old employee would not be appropriate).
In addition, it is suggested that, beyond awarding lump sum payments, courts should
not hesitate to exercise continuing jurisdiction over a case involving front pay and supervise
the payment of "amounts owing" in installments as an alternative. Although such an ap-
proach would entail a type of continuing legal intervention not favored in the context of
employment, it is submitted that it has the advantage of lessening the speculative nature of
the award by allowing the employer to show that the employee has failed to mitigate his
damages. Furthermore, it enables the court, in its discretion, to take into consideration vari-
ous factors that would justify discontinuing payments. There is precedent for such a prac-
tice under both Title VII and the National Labor Relations Act. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v.
Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945, 957 (10th Cir. 1980) (dictum) (in Title VII cases, pay-
ment in installments is "a possible" alternative, but is not mandatory); Hollywood Brands,
Inc., 169 N.L.R.B. 691, 697 (1968); see also Note, supra note 8, at 220-22, 224-29.
7' See Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 335 F. Supp 231, 235 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
7'2 See, e.g., Whittlesey, 742 F.2d at 728; EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
741 F.2d 1225, 1232 (10th Cir. 1984) (citing Blim v. Western Elec. Co., 731 F.2d 1473, 1479
(10th Cir. 1984)).
73 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
74 See Rogers v. Exxon Research Eng'g Co., 404 F. Supp. 324, 330 n.3 (D.N.J. 1975),
vacated, 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978). It has been sug-
gested that rather than providing damages for pain and suffering, "Congress might well
have believed that the resumption of productive work removes the root of the emotional
anxiety .... " Rogers, 550 F.2d at 840.
75 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(1) (1982); Note, supra note 36, at 49 n.3.
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unlawful act.76 This is particularly evident in age discrimination
cases, in which the older employee will more often than not have
great difficulty finding other suitable employment.7 Courts recog-
nizing the availability of front pay have recognized this fact and
have approved the award only when reinstatement has been con-
sidered impracticable.7 s However, it is submitted that clear stan-
dards for evaluating whether reinstatement is feasible in the first
place have not been developed.
Although equitable remedies are generally viewed as within
the discretion of the trial court,79 the Supreme Court has indicated
that the equitable remedy of back pay should be denied in Title
VII cases only in extraordinary situations,8" and only for reasons
that would not frustrate Congressional intent.8 ' This same strict
standard, it is submitted, should be applied by district courts when
determining whether there should be reinstatement in an ADEA
case.
In Whittlesey, the court justified front pay and denied rein-
statement because of "animosity associated with the litigation." 82
It is submitted that such reasoning, without further clarification, is
inadequate since all ADEA claims are likely to create some ani-
mosity.8 3 Therefore, it is suggested that courts should examine the
possibility of reinstatement from a more functional standpoint,
and should deny it only after a clear showing that animosity will
76 See Whittlesey, 742 F.2d at 728. Although a verdict for the plaintiff on an age dis-
crimination claim is ordinarily res judicata on his claim for reinstatement, see, e.g., Cleverly
v. Western Elec. Co., 450 F. Supp. 507, 511 (W.D. Mo. 1978), aff'd, 594 F.2d 638 (8th Cir.
1979), it has been noted that "[r]einstatement is not a mandatory remedy; it lies within the
discretion of the trial court after careful consideration of the particular facts of the case,"
Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982).
7 See Morrison, supra note 35, at 17. Recent data indicates that older persons who
have been working and become unemployed face the longest median duration of unemploy-
ment when searching for another job. Id.
78 See supra note 51.
79 See Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry, 361 U.S. 288, 291 (1960); see also Davis v. Combus-
tion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d at 923 (front pay a matter of discretion with the trial court).
80 Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416-21 (1975)
81 Id. at 421.
82 See Whittlesey, 742 F.2d at 728.
83 Cf. EEOC v. Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919, 926-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),
aff'd, 559 F.2d 1203, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977). In Kallir, Philips, the court noted
that "[s]ome antagonism is the natural result of the filing and litigation of discrimination
and retaliation charges and to deny reinstatement merely because of the existence of hostil-
ity might be contrary to the remedial goals of Title VII." 420 F. Supp.
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actually prevent the plaintiff from performing his job effectively.8 4
Congress has explicitly recognized a need for older workers to re-
tain employment.8 5 This need, it is submitted, indicates that courts
should meticulously scrutinize front pay requests and carefully ar-
ticulate why reinstatement is not feasible.
CONCLUSION
A recent line of cases indicates that, in certain circumstances,
front pay is an acceptable remedy under the ADEA. While this
conclusion as to availability is legally correct and will serve to
avoid injustice in certain situations in which reinstatement is not
feasible, the increasing tendency to dispense the award in lieu of
reinstatement could result in an increase in unemployed, albeit ec-
onomically compensated, victims of age discrimination. If this re-
sult is to be avoided, clear and consistent standards for evaluating
the practicability of reinstatement that focus on the nature of the
job involved need to be developed and employed by the district
courts.
In Whittlesey, the Second Circuit became the first Court of
Appeals to hold that the test for inclusion within the "bona fide
executive" exemption of the ADEA was "one of function, not
pay.18 6 Indeed, the court properly analyzed the nature of Whit-
tlesey's job responsibilities in some detail in reaching its conclusion
as to the applicability of the exemption. No such functional analy-
sis was employed, however, when it came to analyzing the practica-
bility of reinstatement. Yet, such an analysis and a heightened ju-
dicial scrutiny are necessary so that the availability of front pay,
which presents an economic disincentive to reinstatement, does not
64 Compare id. at 927 with Whittlesey, 567 F. Supp. at 1330-31. In Kallir, Philips,
reinstatement of the financial account administrator was denied. 420 F. Supp. at 927. The
court noted that "the situation here is quite unlike that presented when reinstatement is
sought for an assembly line or clerical worker, or even for an executive whose job is not as
sensitive for his employer's interests as is plaintiff's job here." Id. In Whittlesey, on the
other hand, the district court, after noting that the plaintiff "acts primarily as a lawyer,
whose executive responsibilities are minor and who does not exert an impact on company
policy," 567 F. Supp. at 1321, nonetheless denied reinstatement because of "employer's hos-
tility," id. at 1330. In Whittlesey, it was the employer and not the employee who objected to
reinstatement. Id. It is submitted that in refusing to more closely analyze what specific as-
pects of Whittlesey's job would have been impossible to perform in the event of reinstate-
ment, the court, in a very real sense, may have let the employer's vengefulness preclude the
plaintiff from obtaining adequate, congressionally preferred relief. Id.
85 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
86 742 F.2d at 726 (quoting Whittlesey, 567 F. Supp. at 1326).
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frustrate the purposes of a congressionally enumerated and pre-
ferred remedy.
Anthony F. Cottone
